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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Devan appeals from his conviction for felony driving under the influence of alcohol
("DUI"), challenging the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. Mr. Devan argued in
his Appellant's Brief that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the
officer who stopped his vehicle based solely on her observation of the passenger-side tires of his
truck crossing the fog line for approximately 100 yards, lacked reasonable suspicion to believe
he violated Idaho Code§ 49-637(1). The State argues in its Respondent's Brief that Mr. Devan's
driving pattern, coupled with the road conditions, provided the officer with reasonable suspicion
to believe he violated "a number of statutes." (Respondent's Br., p.5.) The State is incorrect on
the facts and the law. The only argument preserved for this Court's review concerns the
applicability of Idaho Code § 49-637(1). The district court erred in concluding the officer had
reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Devan violated this statute, and its decision denying his
motion to suppress must be reversed.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Devan included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his Appellant's
Brief, which he relies on and incorporates herein. (See Appellant's Br., pp.1-2.)

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Devan's motion to suppress?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Devan's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The State contends the district court did not err in denying Mr. Devan's motion to

suppress because Officer Livas had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Devan violated "a
number of statutes"; specifically, Idaho Code §§ 49-637(1), 49-630(1), and 49-1401(3), and thus
had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Devan's vehicle. (Respondent's Br., p.5.) The only
argument preserved for this Court's review is whether Officer Livas had reasonable suspicion to
believe Mr. Devan violated Idaho Code § 49-637(1), which states that "[a] vehicle shall be
driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane
until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety."
The State's arguments regarding Idaho Code § 49-630(1) (setting forth exceptions to the
general requirement that a vehicle be driven upon the right half of the roadway) and § 491401(3) (prohibiting inattentive driving as a lesser offense than reckless driving) are not
preserved for this Court's review, and this Court cannot affirm under a "right-result, wrongtheory" rule. Under a straightforward application of State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439 (2015), and

State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585 (2018), it is clear that Officer Livas did not have reasonable
suspicion to believe Mr. Devan violated § 49-637(1) based solely on her observation of the
passenger-side tires of Mr. Devan's truck crossing the fog line for approximately 100 yards,
lasting three to five seconds. The district court thus erred in denying Mr. Devan's motion to
suppress.

3

B.

The State's Arguments Regarding Idaho Code § 49-630(1) And § 49-1401(3) Are Not
Preserved For This Court's Review
This Court will hold parties to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower

court. State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 672 (2019). This means that "both the issue and the
party's position on the issue be raised before the trial court for it to be properly preserved for
appeal." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the issue of whether the stop of
Mr. Devan's vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion was certainly presented to the trial
court. However, the only argument the State made on this issue concerned Idaho Code § 49637(1). The State's argument on appeal that the stop of Mr. Devan's vehicle was supported by
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Devan violated various other statutes is not preserved, and cannot
be considered by this Court.
The State is essentially asking this Court to affirm under a "right-result, wrong-theory"
rule. This rule can be applied by an appellate court when the lower court finds one theory to be
dispositive, and decides the case only on that theory, to the exclusion of other theories raised in
the lower court. See, e.g., State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217,443 P.3d 231, 236-37 (2019). The
appellate court may uphold the lower's court's decision on the alternate basis if, and only if,
certain conditions are met. Id. at 236. As this Court explained in Hoskins:
First, because the lower court did not reach the alternate issue, the appellate court
must be satisfied that the parties had adequate opportunity to present evidence and
arguments on the alternative issue. In other words, there must be sufficient facts
in the appellate record on which to base a decision on alternate grounds.
Satisfaction of this condition will usually be dependent on the second condition:
the theory on which the lower court decides the issue must not reroute the course
of proceedings so that the alternate base does not have a chance to be litigated.
That is, the affected party must have the reason and the opportunity to properly
respond to the alternate grounds.
Id. at 236.
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In Hoskins, this Court concluded the State's plain-view theory was not properly
preserved for appeal, even if it provided the correct legal reasoning, because it is an exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement that the State did not raise in the trial court. Id. at
237. Here, like in Hoskins, the State is arguing that Mr. Devan violated statutes that were
mentioned, but never argued, in the district court. 1 It would be unfair for this Court to affirm
under one of these alternate statutes as Mr. Devan did not have an opportunity to litigate the
applicability of these statutes in the district court. See id.; see also Gonzales, 165 Idaho at 100.
This Court explained in Hoskins that it "has placed a premium on counsel presenting the
facts and law that it chooses to support its position in the trial court." 443 P .3d at 240 (citation
omitted). In this case, the prosecutor presented facts and law regarding the applicability of Idaho
Code § 49-637(1). The mere fact that the prosecutor mentioned a number of other statutes in
passing does not preserve any other statutory argument for this Court's review, as the prosecutor
did not specifically argue how or why those statutes applied. See id.; see also Fuller, 163 Idaho
at 590-91 (rejecting the state's argument that it preserved an argument under § 49-630(1)
"without having asserted the same before the district court").

1

The prosecutor attempted to distinguish this case from Neal and Fuller in his written objection
and memorandum in opposition to Mr. Devan's motion to suppress. (See R., pp.77-83.) In the
final paragraph of the memorandum, the prosecutor argued "[Mr. Devan's] driving pattern could
have been indicative of a number of violations, including but not limited to Idaho Code §§ 49637(1), 49-630(1), 49-1401A, 49-1401(3), and/or 18-8004, all of which are contrary to Idaho
laws and would qualify as possible criminal activity .... " (R., p.82.) The prosecutor did not
explain how Mr. Devan could have violated these statutes. (See id.) The prosecutor did not even
recite the language of these statutes or state what these statutes prohibit. (See id.) At the hearing
on Mr. Devan's motion to suppress, the prosecutor did not provide any additional explanation as
to how Mr. Devan could have violated any statute other than§ 49-637(1). The prosecutor made
only a single reference to any statute, stating, "So I think it's a violation of 49-637 as well as 49630." (Tr., p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.25.)
5

C.

Officer Livas Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Believe Mr. Devan Violated Idaho
Code § 49-637(1)
This Court made clear in Neal and Fuller that the purpose of a fog line it to "serve[] as a

point of reference that is geared towards ensuring drivers' safety." Fuller, 163 Idaho at 590
(citing Neal, 159 Idaho at 447 ). This Court made equally clear that "the fog line is not a lane
barrier." Fuller, 163 Idaho at 589 (emphasis in original). "And given that the fog line does not
signify a formal lane barrier, an isolated incident of temporarily crossing the fog line ... does not
violate section 49-637(1)." Id. at 590. While "driving onto or across the fog line may be
considered when evaluating whether an overall pattern of erratic or unsafe driving gives to a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that section 49-63 7( 1) has been violated under the totality of the
circumstances . . . that suspicion must be based on more than one tire temporarily touching or
briefly crossing the fog line." Id.
Here, Officer Livas did not observe an overall pattern of erratic or unsafe driving that
could give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Devan violated§ 49-637(1). The State points
repeatedly to "the nature of the road and the nature of Devan's crossing of the edge-line" as
factors supporting reasonable suspicion. (Respondent's Br., p.9.) But these factors are
unremarkable. Mr. Devan was driving late in the evening on a cold, windy night in January.
(Tr., p.7, Ls.4-13, p.9, Ls.17-20, p.16, Ls.22-25.) He could not have hit a pedestrian or bicyclist
because there were no pedestrians or bicyclists present. (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-11.)
The question, then, is simply whether Mr. Devan's act of driving over the fog line for
three to five seconds is sufficient to distinguish this case from Neal and Fuller. It is not.
Mr. Devan never left his lane, as the fog line he crossed was not a lane barrier, and Officer Livas
did not observe any other conduct on the part of Mr. Devan that would create a reasonable

6

suspicion that he had violated § 49-637(1). The district court erred in denying Mr. Devan's
motion to suppress and its decision should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Devan respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district court's
order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 4 th day of June, 2020.

I sf Andrea W. Reyno Ids
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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